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LR&W SHOULD BEGIN AT THE BEGINNING:
READING LEGAL AUTHORITY
Jane Kent Gionfriddo
Boston College Law School
We all know that many of our students
come to law school with a fundamental
problem: they don’t read critically. Given
this, each year I spend more time in class
teaching students this important skill and
its relevance to thorough and sophisticated
legal analysis.
Throughout the first semester, when much
of class discussion focuses on case analysis,
I make students support their assertions
with specific language from the relevant
case or cases. At such points I ask
students, “on what page did the court
discuss this idea?” When students locate
the language, I make them read the phrase,
sentence or passage aloud. Sometimes
students find that the language of the case
validates their ideas. Sometimes, though,
students realize that what the court did
state on the page is quite different from
what they remember, or they realize that
the language on the page (or lack thereof)
indicates they drew an inference that was
incorrect.
One of my classes toward the middle of
the first semester illustrates this process.
At this point, students are working on the
analysis of a requirement in a common
law tort cause of action in Massachusetts
that concerns the relationship between a
direct victim and bystander. Students have
read and analyzed the relevant cases on
their own to prepare for class discussion.
As students answer questions on the facts
of each case and whether the court found
those facts to satisfy the requirement, I
require them to support their assertions by
going back to the language of the case.
Coming into class, students think they
have read and analyzed the cases carefully;
class discussion points out that in some
instances they have not.
For example, students are excited about
one highest appeals court case because it is
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If you are at the high end of the range, your survey is just as
important. We need to show that low salaries in legal writing are
not the norm and are not inevitable. The more high-end salaries
that are included, the higher the salary averages go, and the better
able we are to get that message across.
I’m a case in point on the importance of the surveys. As many of
you know, I will move from a staff position to a tenure-track
faculty position at Ohio State this summer. When this issue came
before the faculty, the question I heard most often was, “is
anybody else doing this?” Perhaps because lawyers rely so much
on precedent, law faculties frequently want to know if there is any
precedent for actions they are taking. It was great to be able to
hand them Jan Levine’s latest compilation of Legal Writing
program structures and the latest LWI survey.
Even those of us with only a rudimentary knowledge of statistics
know that the bigger the survey, the more useful the results are. So,
no matter where you are, no matter what your salary or your
status, PLEASE COMPLETE AND SEND IN YOUR SURVEY AS
SOON AS YOU CAN!  I thank you, and your colleagues thank you.
I can’t let this issue of The Second Draft go to press without a big
thank you to the people who have put it together for the past six
years. This is the last issue of The Second Draft to be published
by the Boston College Law School Legal Writing faculty. The next
issue will be published by Barbara Busharis at Florida State
University and Suzanne Rowe, who is moving from Florida State
University to direct the legal writing program at University of
Oregon.
Jane Gionfriddo and Joan Blum have done a fabulous job with
The Second Draft, working on it since 1994. In recent years, they
have been assisted by their Boston College colleagues, Judy Tracy
who joined the staff in 1998, and Lis Keller who joined in 1999.
Jane and Joan’s
continuation of the
idea of “theme
issues” has made The
Second Draft an
invaluable resource
for new legal writing
faculty. They have
given many of us our
first published piece,
and perhaps the
courage to send an
article in to a law journal.
The next President’s column will be written by Jane Gionfriddo.
Even as she gives up the responsibility of publishing The Second
Draft, she will assume the presidency of the Legal Writing
Institute. I know that LWI will be in great hands.
Regards,
Mary Beth Beazley
President, Legal Writing Institute
Director of Legal Writing 
The Ohio State University College of Law 
Essays by Members of The Institute on Teaching Analysis
Reading Critically is the Foundation for Legal Analysis
the only case they have located that
“addresses” whether a sibling relationship
is sufficient. In fact, the highest appeals
court does describe how the trial court
had found that a minor sibling of the
direct victim satisfied the relationship
requirement. What students have missed,
however, is a quick, seemingly insignificant
statement of procedural history: while the
mother of the direct victim had appealed
her cause of action to the highest appeals
court, the sibling of the direct victim had
not. Skipping over this piece of the
procedural history, students fail to realize
that the sibling relationship was never
before the highest appeals court and that
consequently, the case indicates nothing at
all concerning whether a sibling will satisfy
the relationship requirement. At that
precise moment, students begin to
comprehend the dangers of reading
uncritically, especially because we go on to
discuss a supervisor’s reaction to receiving
an analysis based upon an erroneous
reading of this case.
In another case, the relationship is between
a mother and her son, who are residents of
different states. The son dies in a plane
crash. When I ask what specific
relationship was before the court, students
always answer parent/adult child and that
this is important since the rest of the
Massachusetts cases have only made clear
that a parent-minor child relationship
satisfies the requirement. I respond by
asking the class to locate the specific place
in the case where the court describes the
son as an “adult,” and I give the class plenty
of time to go through the case. Scouring
the case, students can find no reference at
all to an “adult” son even though coming
into class they would have sworn that the
words “adult son” were stated explicitly
somewhere within the case.
Finding no explicit reference, students
articulate the real basis of why they believe
the son was an adult: “Well, the son was
living in another state and traveling on an
airplane, and thus he had to have been an
adult.” Once this idea is out in the open,
other students immediately recognize that
the facts of “living in another state” and
“traveling on an airplane” do not require
the resulting inference that the son was an
adult. At this point, someone always
brings up a hypothetical scenario, such as
a minor child of divorced parents traveling
to see a parent living in another state. In
this manner, students come to understand
that the case simply doesn’t give them
sufficient facts to know one way or the
other. They confront how reading
uncritically allowed them to “infer into the
case” the words “adult son” when in fact it
was an unsubstantiated inference from
other facts in the case. We conclude this
scenario by discussing how it would feel to
be arguing before a judge and have that
judge point out to you that you had just
“made up” a fact in a case. I point out that
making up a fact in a case is completely
different from synthesizing a group of
cases together to come up with implicit
reasoning.
Teaching students to read critically in this
manner takes a great deal of time in class.
Yet the benefits are substantial. Students
are forced to confront just how well they
have read each individual case. They see
in a vivid manner how easy it is to miss
key ideas and how missing those key ideas
can seriously undermine their
understanding of the case. In essence, it is
this foundation of learning how to read
well that prepares students for all the other
analytical skills required in sophisticated
legal problem-solving.

Case Analysis
ROLLING UP THEIR SLEEVES: USING A
SINGLE CASE TO TEACH MULTI-FACETED
CASE ANALYSIS 
Maureen Straub Kordesh
The John Marshall Law School
I have found that a fundamental confusion
among beginning law students results from
their inability to recognize the rich legal
analytical context within which each
opinion is nested. An experienced attorney
“sees” this context, which includes
precedential and non-precedential analysis,
statutory analogies, legal history, policy,
and logical and inductive analysis. All
judicial opinions exist within this context,
even when the printed word does not
express it; attorneys are always, at least
unconsciously, aware of it.
It seems an old idea, really, using a case to
teach analysis, but to its credit, it is not
gimmicky, and to students it feels “real.”
On the other hand, it appears to be a very
traditional method. However, I believe
that it is not, and hope that, if you try it,
you will be pleased with the results. I use
this exercise early in the first semester,
when students are most receptive to
learning techniques for close case analysis.
I recommend this approach for anyone
who believes, as my father taught me, that
the most competent engineers are the ones
who take real engines apart and put them
back together.
The trick is to find the right case. I use
Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, a famous biotechnology case in
which the plaintiff was deceived into
returning for tests and therapy for several
years after he had been successfully treated
for leukemia. Apparently, his cells were
unique, and defendants used them to
develop a patented cell line with a
projected value over a billion dollars. The
issue was whether his bodily tissues and
fluids were property; if so, he could
maintain an action in conversion and
recover for their wrongful appropriation.
Moore is a “sexy” case and students usually
read it enthusiastically.
Moore lays bare various techniques of
legal analysis. It also provides a response-
in a concurrence and dissents-to each of
the legal analysis techniques the majority
uses. Thus, it gives students a uniquely
rich view of the context of analysis on a
single fact pattern. Two examples will,
hopefully, suffice to illustrate the opinion’s
usefulness in teaching students to
recognize methods of analysis.
The first technique we discuss is
precedential analysis, something they do in
their other classes as well. The court
explicitly states that “no reported judicial
decision supports [his] claim” and rejects
the law of privacy as a precedential
justification for recognizing property
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